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Abstract: 
 In 2008, African Americans overwhelmingly supported Senator Obama in his bid for the 
Presidency. Their supported averaged at 95% of African American voters. At the same time that 
Senator Obama was on the ballet, Prop 8 – legislation designed to amend California’s 
Constitution to define marriage as between a man and woman – was passed with a large majority 
of African American support. Why did strong Democrats vote in favor of a law that most 
Democrats rejected? Previous research has concluded it was the role of the Black Church in 
African American politics that moves the community to a more conservative ideology on social 
issues. Using polling data from 2010 and 2012, I will look at if President Obama had any impact 
on views on African Americans to see if he has sway in the same way as the Black Church. The 
key to these two data sets is that he changed his opinion on the issue of same-sex marriage very 
publically between these two polls. If he had an effect, a sizable change should show African 
American views on same-sex marriage.  
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Introduction: 
 In 2008 African American voters turned out in mass amounts to vote for the First African 
American presidential candidate, Democratic Party nominee Barack Obama. In the same election 
cycle, African Americans voted overwhelmingly in support of Prop 8, a ballot initiative in 
California that defined marriage as being between a man and woman. Traditionally, by being 
members of the Democratic Party coalition, African Americans were assumed by proponents of 
same-sex marriage to be more likely to vote for liberal ideals, in this case supporting the rights of 
same-sex couples to marry. This, however, was not the case. African Americans’ voting behavior 
on the Prop 8 issue led public opinion scholars to reconsider the factors shaping African 
American political views. They found that the behavior seen by African Americans on Prop 8 
was likely caused by the ideology of the Black Church combined with the belief that same-sex 
marriage was not a civil rights issue.  
 Since these events in 2008, the nation as a whole has shifted from majority opposition to 
same-sex marriage to a slim majority of the general public being in favor of same-sex marriage. 
However, the trend of African Americans opposing same-sex marriage has continued. 
Presumably, African Americans continue to acquire their political views from the same place as 
they had in the past, namely the Black Church. However, now that an African American is 
President it could be argued that Barack Obama now serves as the primary influence on African 
American political views, replacing the traditional role of black churches. If he is the primary 
influence for African Americans, then by him supporting same-sex marriage and referring to it as 
a civil rights issue, the opinions of the African American community should have shifted on this 
subject.  
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The same-sex marriage debate gives us a unique opportunity to study leadership in the African 
American community for several reasons. First, African Americans have remained relatively 
consistent in their opposition to same-sex marriage. Second, their views appear to have been 
shaped by the churches they belong to in their roles as the social and political leader of the 
African American community. Third, an African American now sits in the most powerful 
political office in the US and is considered an inspiration to the African American community. 
Fourth, the nation as a whole has shifted in favor of same-sex marriage while African Americans 
appear to have remained opposed. Next, in 2010 President Obama and the Black Church were 
presumed to have had similar views on same-sex marriage; however, by 2012, these views had 
diverged. Finally, polling data exists on African Americans and their views on same-sex 
marriage in both time periods.  
With the above factors in place, it should be easy to compare and see if a change happens over 
the time period as President Obama changes his opinion. To test this, I posit the following 
hypotheses: If African Americans are willing to accept political views from sources other than 
the Black Church, than President Obama’s declaration of support for same-sex marriage should 
cause a shift among African Americans towards favoring same-sex marriage. Alternately, if the 
Black Church and its views are the most powerful political factors effecting the views of African 
Americans, than President Obama coming out in support of same-sex marriage should have no 
effect. To test this, I will be using polling data from 2010 (before Obama showed support for 
same-sex marriage) and data from 2012 (after the President’s support for same-sex marriage) to 
see if any significant changes occurred in the African American community on the issue of 
same-sex marriage.  
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Along with views on same-sex marriage, I will also look at Obama’s approval rating among 
African Americans to assess if there is a correlation between the level of approval he gets from 
African Americans and the way they perceive same-sex marriage by the 2012 poll. If his views 
do affect them, than African Americans that highly approve of his job performance should show 
a significant decrease in opposition to same sex marriage. In contrast, African Americans who do 
not view his performance positively should have no impact of their views of same-sex marriage. 
I addition, I look at other factors (such as age, education level, socioeconomic status, etc.) to see 
if any of these have also had an impact on African American views on same-sex marriage. These 
items must be considered as alternative hypotheses, but could also simply be factors that when 
added to support for Obama give a more accurate image of what is happening in the African 
American community. However, before I carry these tests out, I present the following 
background information concerning the political landscape of the same-sex marriage debate. 
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How Prop 8 Tied African Americans Directly to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate:  
On November 4, 2008, California helped elect then Senator Barack Obama to the Presidency 
with an overwhelming Democratic majority in that state. At the same time, California voters 
passed Proposition 8 - a measure initiative that amended the State constitution to define marriage 
as exclusively between a man and a woman - by a vote of 52% to 48% (Egan & Wallsten, 2008). 
This amendment to the state constitution revoked the newly established marriage rights of same-
sex couples, who could legally marry in California from June 16, 2008, until the enactment of 
Proposition 8 on November 5, 2008. California’s unique social and political culture and its 
influence in U.S. politics had led many to believe that Prop 8 would not pass. Culturally, 
California is often seen as a frontrunner for the U.S. population as a whole, and as California 
changes, it is the indication that the rest of the country will soon do the same (Lewis & Gossett, 
2008). Part of this is because California’s social policies are often seen as being more liberal and 
progressive politically than other parts of the United States, but with California acting in the 
same manner as the Southern and Plains States on the issue of same-sex marriage, many saw this 
as a major step back for the movement.   
The passage of Proposition 8 was viewed as not only legalizing discrimination against gay men, 
lesbians and bisexual men and women in California, but also as a barometer of homophobia and 
heterosexism in U.S. culture (Lewis & Gossett, 2008). Although research generally documents a 
liberalization of Americans’ attitudes toward gay men and lesbians over the past 20 years 
(Herek, 2009; Herek, Norton, Allen, & Sims, 2010), a majority of Americans in 2008 still 
viewed homosexuality and same-sex relationships as immoral, and nearly 60% opposed 
legalizing same-sex marriage (Pew Research Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010). Not 
surprisingly, after the passage of the measure, opponents of Proposition 8 reacted with 
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disappointment, dismay, and outrage. Many people sought a simple answer to the complex 
question: Why did Proposition 8 pass? For some, the answer involved singling out a particular 
demographic: the African American community in California.  
 
Wedge Issues: Separating African Americans From the Democrat Coalition: 
 In 2004, President Bush - while in the middle of two wars - made his campaign about 
morals and values. In 2003, the Supreme Court had declared sodomy laws unconstitutional, and 
Massachusetts’ Supreme Court had said that their state constitution guaranteed same-sex couples 
the right to marry. With these court decisions changing major policy in the country, President 
Bush decided to make same-sex marriage the center of his conservative values campaign. He 
warned of liberal Democrats that would repeal the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). By his 
2004 State of the Union Address, he was ready to take the issue to the next level by attacking the 
federal courts and asking for an amendment to the Constitution to define marriage as between a 
man and a woman. In his Address, he stated “Activist judges, however, have begun redefining 
marriage by court order . . . . If judges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon the people, the 
only alternative left to the people would be the constitutional process. Our nation must defend 
the sanctity of marriage,” (Duncan 2009, p 11). With these words, the Federal Marriage 
Amendment (FMA) became a real topic of the 2004 election period. The political belief was that 
by making the campaign focused on domestic value issues, the Bush campaign could take at least 
some of the spotlight off of the two wars in the Middle East, and this focus could galvanize the 
Republican base and increase their turnout in the presidential election. But arguably there is 
another important thing this issue was able to do: it may have been able to pull center moderates 
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who would normally vote for a Democrat to his side because of the saliency of their views on 
same-sex marriage.  
 In their book The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns (2008), 
Hillygus and Shields look at how one campaign can siphon off voters from their opponents by 
focusing on issues that divide the electorate. They define wedge issues as “any policy concern 
that is used to divide the opposition’s potential winning coalition,” (Hillygus & Shields, 2008, 
36). In Bush’s 2004 reelection bid, his campaign looked at same-sex marriage as a way to 
motivate their base and get the base to the polls, but at the same time, same-sex marriage was an 
issue that many centrists had strong feelings on. These centrists may support Democrats’ 
candidates in general, but they also found themselves attracted to President Bush’s clear stance 
in opposition to same-sex marriage. Hillygus and Shields state “Candidates do not manipulate 
voters to change their policy attitudes or to vote against their preferences. Rather, campaigns 
help voters translate their predispositions into their candidate selection by increasing the salience 
of one consideration over another” (2008, 185). The issue of same-sex marriage was able to both 
coalesce the base and also bring additional voters over to Bush who may have otherwise voted 
for Kerry by increasing the saliency of the issue. This is, by Hillygus and Shields definition, a 
clear wedge issue that President Bush was able to use to his advantage in 2004. 
In 2000, California voters adopted Proposition 22, which amended the Family Code to provide 
that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California,” (Cal. 
Fam. Code § 308.5).  In May 2008, the California Supreme Court struck down Proposition 22, 
holding that it violated the due process and equal protection guarantees of the California 
Constitution, and ordered the State to issue marriage licenses without regard to the sex of the 
prospective spouses, (In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008)). After the California 
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Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage Cases, Proposition 8’s proponents campaigned to 
amend the California Constitution to abolish the right of gay men and lesbians to marry that was 
recognized by the state supreme court. These actions turned same-sex marriage into a wedge 
issue for California. Although no one believed that California would vote for a Republican for 
the presidency, many local and state wide office seekers latched onto same-sex marriage 
opposition as a way to attract some centrist voters in the way President Bush had. This time 
however the use of a wedge issue did not work as well as in 2004.  
The interesting thing about the 2008 California election results is that although many Democrats 
split from their party to vote in favor of Proposition 8, they did not vote for Republicans for 
political offices. The Democrats that split from the party on same-sex marriage were firmly 
enough based into the Party as to not defect; however they were willing to vote with the 
Republican Party on the issue of same-sex marriage. This implies that there is a subsection of the 
Democratic Party that, although associating in most ways with the party, breaks on some social 
conservative issues. These “cross-pressured partisans” agree with a majority of their party’s 
ideology but break on this issue (Hillygus & Shields, 2008, 18). The difference between what 
happened here and the scenarios that Hillygus and Shields explain in their book is that the break 
due to that issue did not change the cross-pressured partisans want to vote for democrats. The 
cross-pressured partisans simply split their tickets. They voted for Democrats and for Prop 8.  
As soon as the election’s votes were cast and counted, people wanted to know who had split 
from the Democratic Party to help pass Proposition 8. Some wanted to know because they 
needed someone to blame. Conversely, others wanted to know because this could be a group 
they could rely upon on other social conservative issues. CNN gave both groups an answer. 
CNN’s exit poll (November, 2008) reported that 70% of African Americans supported 
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Proposition 8. Blacks that voted for President Obama at a rate of 95% had also voted for Prop 8 
at 70% according to CNN. The Black community in California makes up roughly 6% of the 
electorate, so 70% of that 6% would translate into 4% of the electorate. Prop 8 passed with 52%, 
so had the 4% of the electorate represented by Blacks not split with the Democratic Party, Prop 8 
would not have passed.  
 
True Level of Black Vote For Prop 8: 
 Although many took the 70% figure reported by CNN as truth, Patrick Egan and Kenneth 
Sherrill decided to look at the election results more closely. They looked at a range of data 
sources – opinion polls from before and after the election, nationwide surveys and polls, and 
precinct-level election returns – to “assess the accuracy of the NEP poll (reported by CNN) and 
better understand the nature of racial and ethnic differences in Californians’ votes on Proposition 
8,” (Egan & Sherrill, 2010, 3). They are able to point out that none of the methods they 
employed could produce rates that put support in the Black community at 70%. In fact the 
highest they could reach in any of their research was 59% of the Black community supporting 
Prop 8. 
 First, Egan and Sherrill point out that historically there has been no statistically 
significant difference in votes between minorities and Whites (2010, 6). Their research has 
shown that consistently through other vote measures around the country, Blacks and Latinos 
voted at a rate similar to Whites. They state that in every state except California Whites have 
voted at a higher rate than minorities on similar measures to Prop 8. The difference (not 
including California) in support between Whites and Blacks has been .18 percentage points and 
2.8 percentage points for Whites and Latinos (Egan & Sherrill, 2010, 6). This historical piece of 
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the information supports Egan and Sherrill’s assumption that the publicized 70% Black support 
for Prop 8 is a likely exaggeration. Considering that the standard difference between the two 
groups is only .18 percentage points, a difference of 21 percentage points would be highly 
improbable.  
 Secondly, Egan and Sherrill look at survey data from six different surveys that were all 
conducted immediately before or after the November 2008 election. These surveys put Black 
support for Prop 8 between 41% and 58%, so even at the highest point, it is still 12 percentage 
points lower than the NEP exit poll survey (Egan & Sherrill, 2010, 7). Next Egan and Sherrill 
turned to ecological analysis of precinct-level voting data. This data was taken from five 
California counties – Alameda, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego, and San Francisco – which 
comprise 62.4% of the states African American population as well as 48% of its Latino 
population (Egan & Sherrill, 2010, 7). Egan and Sherrill merged the voting data with estimates 
of the precincts’ racial and ethnic makeup. Their results showed a clear relationship between the 
proportion of a precinct’s voters who are Black and Latino and support for Prop 8 (Egan & 
Sherrill, 2010, 8). The three estimates they used – EzI software, Goodman’s ecological 
regression, and homogeneous precincts – put Black support for Prop 8 at 57, 59, and 59 percents 
respectfully (Egan & Sherrill, 2010, 8).  
 Egan and Sherrill explain that when reviewing all the polling date and election results 
two conclusions can be made. The first is that the exit poll conducted by NEP and released by 
CNN clearly overestimated Black support for Prop 8. The second conclusion that they were able 
to draw is that although the NEP surveys overestimated, it was right that Blacks and Latinos 
supported Proposition 8 at a rate considerably higher than Whites in California (Egan & Sherrill, 
2010, 9). This is significant because it is a departure from the rates reported in other states that 
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consistently have White support slightly higher than Blacks or Latinos for bans on same-sex 
marriage. An additional point that must be made is that California was the first strong Democrat 
controlled state to vote in favor of banning same-sex marriage. The ballet initiative did not pass 
because of overwhelming support of White Evangelical Protestants as it had in most 
conservative leaning states. It needed a coalition of religious groups that included minorities.  
 Taking all of their findings into account, Egan and Sherrill made an additional step after 
their conclusions on the NEP poll. They took 49 different polls conducted over a twenty-one year 
period, from 1988 to 2009, to see if patterns had emerged in different ethnic groups for how they 
view same-sex marriage. From 1988 – 2003, Latinos were the most supportive followed by 
Whites and then Blacks. Following the 2003 Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v Texas, all 
three groups increased their opposition to same-sex marriage. After a short period, Latinos and 
Whites coalesced at about the same level of support that Whites had prior to Lawrence, but 
Black opposition remained at a heightened level (Egan & Sherrill, 2010, 13). From 2003 to 2009, 
White support for same-sex marriage among Democrats increased by 15%; Latino support 
increased by 7%; while Black support barely changed (Egan & Sherrill, 2010, 13).  
In one of the most comprehensive studies of Black–White differences in attitudes toward 
homosexuality, Lewis (2003) analyzed the responses of over 7,000 Black heterosexuals and 
43,000 White heterosexuals from 31 national survey studies conducted between 1973 and 2000. 
Results showed that, overall, compared to Whites, Blacks reported greater disapproval of 
homosexuality. Similarly, data from a 2008 national Gallup poll of over 3,000 Americans 
documented that only 31% of Black Democrats viewed “homosexual relations” as morally 
acceptable—a figure that is radically different from the one reported by non-Black Democrats 
(61%) but roughly the same as that reported by Republicans (30%), (Newport, 2008). 
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Furthermore, the report also showed that only 30% of Black Democrats, compared to 57% of 
non-Black Democrats and 22% of Republicans, were supportive of legalizing same-sex marriage 
(Newport, 2008). Based on these results, Newport concluded that “in most instances, Blacks 
come much closer to the positions of Republicans than to those of Democrats” (2008).  
 This information helps shed additional light on what happened with Proposition 8 in 
California. White Democrats had moved on the subject and assumed that Blacks had also. 
However, these polls show that opinion was in error. Black Democrats have remained in 
opposition to same-sex marriage while the rest of the party had shifted. Once this information is 
understood, the next important step is to try and determine what caused the continued opposition 
of African Americans to same-sex marriage.  
 
The Likely Source of African American Political Views - The Black Church: 
In the months following the passage of Proposition 8, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 
conducted a comprehensive study examining factors that influenced California voters (Egan & 
Sherrill, 2009). In addition to demonstrating that the initial numbers regarding the Black vote 
were wrong, and that 58% of Black Californians supported Proposition 8, Egan and Sherrill also 
showed that “[B]lack support for Proposition 8 can largely be explained by Blacks’ higher levels 
of religiosity—a characteristic strongly associated with opposition to same-sex marriage” (2009, 
17). Scholars from various disciplines have long noted the importance of religion, the Black 
church, and God in the lives of Black Americans. Ghavami and Johnson quote Pattillo-McCoy 
saying, “ The Black church is the anchoring institution in the Black community. . .the church 
simultaneously acts as a school, a bank, a benevolent society, a political organization, a party 
hall, and a spiritual base,” (2011, 398). Because the church serves as a guiding principle for 
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many Blacks, its teachings, ideologies, and political positions can carry a significant weight in 
determining the social and political views of Blacks. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that if the 
church takes a conservative view on homosexuality and same-sex marriage, so too will those 
who attend such traditional or conservative Black churches. By contrast, those who attend more 
progressive or liberal churches should adopt a more liberal stance on homosexuality and same-
sex marriage. 
Taking the above facts about the role of the Black church into account, efforts to target Black 
voters were primarily channeled via Black churches and their ministers. In October 2008, 
Apostle Frederick K.C. Price, the influential minister of the Crenshaw Christian Center in Los 
Angeles, organized a press conference that included fifty African American and Latino pastors 
from the Los Angeles area, to express their support for Proposition 8. Similar actions occurred in 
historically Black churches in Oakland and San Francisco, where Black ministers in favor of 
Proposition 8 organized similar rallies (Moore, 2010). As Ghavami and Johnson (2011) have 
discussed, the church has traditionally been the most significant institution to help organize the 
Black community and on this issue, the role of the church was especially salient and relevant. 
In fact, the tight connection between conservative religiosity and opposition to same-sex 
marriage has been well documented. Findings reported by the Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press (2009) showed that 74% of Black Protestants and 78% of White 
Evangelical Protestants strongly oppose same-sex marriage as compared to only 27% of secular 
voters. Attendance of services is also strongly linked to opposition to same-sex marriage. Egan 
and Sherrill (2010), documented that, overall, frequency of religious services attendance 
accounted for nearly 12% of the variance in the Proposition 8 vote of the electorate. Roughly 
43% of all California voters attended religious services weekly or more. This number, however, 
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was notably higher among Black voters (57%) than among other ethnic voting blocs and was 
associated with Blacks’ greater support for Proposition 8. These results suggest that conservative 
religious teaching underlies Blacks’ views on same-sex marriage. 
 
Civil Rights v. Moral Issues:  
 
Another factor that might account for Blacks’ attitudes may have to do with perceptions that the 
struggle for marriage equality is or is not parallel to the Black Civil Rights struggle. Civil rights 
are often defined as legal or moral claims that a citizen is entitled to make on their government. 
In other words, Civil Rights are the ability to fight to be married as interracial couples, to go to 
mixed race schools, to not have to have separate dining facilities, job protections, and so on. The 
question becomes, do Blacks view the struggles by the LGBT community for same-sex marriage 
rights, adoption rights, workplace anti-discrimination, and so on as being similar to the Civil 
Rights Campaign of the 1960s? The following quote by Reggie Whitherspoon Sr., a Black 
Christian pastor illustrates this point: 
Gay marriage is not a civil-rights issue at all, but a moral issue. There are so many things that 
gays can do that my grandmother couldn’t do. They can vote, they can live where they want to 
live. I don’t see anyone siccing dogs on gays like they did to Blacks in the 60s. It’s radically 
different. And to suggest that it isn’t is an injustice to the civil-rights era (Ghavami & Johnson 
2011). 
 
Whitherspoon Sr.’s remarks suggest that those Blacks who supported a ban on same-sex 
marriage do not construe the fight for marriage equality as analogous to the Civil Rights 
Campaign. Commenting further on how Blacks perceive the connection between same-sex 
marriage struggles and the Civil Rights Campaign of the 1960s, Jazmyn Cannick, a Black lesbian 
activist wrote: 
The Black Civil Rights Movement was essentially born out of and driven by the Black church; 
social justice and religion are inextricably intertwined in the Black community. To many Blacks, 
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civil rights are grounded in Christianity—not something separate and apart from religion but 
synonymous with it. To the extent that the issue of gay marriage seemed to be pitted against the 
church, it was going to be a losing battle in my community (Ghavami & Johnson 2011). 
 
These two quotes point out two major issues for the LGBT community when trying to draw 
parallels to the Civil Rights Movement. The first issue is that the Civil Rights Movement was 
directly tied to the Black church. Pastors and preachers’ sermons spoke to that community 
allowing its members to start standing up for their rights. The Black church was the spiritual and 
physical leader in the Civil Rights Movement. By contrast, the LGBT movement has been 
shunned by most churches. This movement works outside of the church, not out of choice, but 
because the church wants nothing to do with this movement. The added concerns of the church 
that homosexuality is a sin help paint the LGBT movement as immoral, and thus Blacks see it as 
a moral issue and not civil rights. The second major issue pointed out is that many Blacks may 
be offended by the LGBT population drawing parallels between their movement and the Civil 
Rights Movement. Blacks, especially the older generations, experienced and witnessed the 
prejudice unleashed upon their family and friends. Some of these things have happened in the 
gay community (Stonewall, Matthew Sheppard, and countless incidents of bulling some of which 
led to suicide), but as a whole, the violence that was associated with the Civil Rights Movement 
is missing from the LGBT Movement. This causes many in the Black community to not see the 
LGBT Movement as a true Civil Rights Movement.  
Ghavami and Johnson (2011) did a study to determine if LGBTs and Blacks saw an analogy 
between the struggle for same-sex marriage and the Civil Rights Campaign. Participants 
indicated the extent to which they personally consider same-sex marriage equality to be 
analogous to the Civil Rights Campaign of the 1960s on a 10-point scale ranging from not at all 
similar (0) to extremely similar (9). LGBT respondents were then asked “to answer the same 
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question from the perspective of an average Black voter (emphasis added)” (Ghavami & 
Johnson, 2011, 404).   
 
Lit Review Part 2 - President Obama: 
 As noted above, African Americans have gotten their views on same-sex marriage in 
large part from the Black Church, but they have also had issues with whether same-sex marriage 
is a civil rights issue or moral issue. It seemed that President Obama had a similar issue. He often 
discussed his views on same-sex marriage as “evolving” while tackling other LGBT issues head-
on. He acknowledged many of the concerns of the African American community and the nation 
as a whole, while continually saying that his views were slowly changing. His views seem to 
have a clear breaking point right after the 2010 mid-terms. At this point he seems to begin to 
accept same-sex marriage as a Civil Rights issue, and by 2012, he has come out in full support of 
same-sex marriage. It is important to understand this timeline and how rapidly his views changed 
(along with much of the nation). By understanding the trajectory of his views over a period of 
time, one can see the possible direction he has put the African American community on for 
LGBT issues.  
 
President Obama 2009 – Midterms: 
During the campaign, then Senator Obama had strongly advocated the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy on gays in the military, equal treatment under federal employee 
health plans, and repeal of the DOMA (Alter, 2010, p 22). Obama stopped short of supporting 
gay marriage, however, fearing that this might endanger his appeal to religious conservatives. 
Once in office, his focus on economic recovery and health-care legislation led to a “no 
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distractions” policy on gay rights issues (Alter, 2010, p 79). Rather, Obama followed a low 
visibility strategy: appointing gays to important administrative posts, issuing an executive order 
providing some partner benefits for gay federal employees, preparing new rules to protect 
transgender federal employees, and formally inviting gay families to the White House Easter Egg 
Roll (Alter, 2010, p 79). But his continued verbal support for repeal of both DADT and DOMA, 
combined with the lack of action, only succeeded in frustrating both sides in the culture wars. 
Events soon forced Obama’s hand. As gay rights groups challenged DOMA in the federal courts, 
the Justice Department followed custom in defending the constitutionality of the statute. When 
the department’s brief became public, gay rights leaders put enormous pressure on the White 
House to reverse this action. On June 29, 2009, at a White House gathering of gay rights leaders, 
the president reiterated his commitment to repeal DOMA, end DADT, and press for passage of 
hate crimes legislation (Alexander, 2011). He stated that congressional leaders saw little prospect 
for the repeal of DOMA, but the Justice Department would amend its brief in defense of its 
constitutionality with a strong statement advocating repeal. Obama resisted suggestions to end 
DADT by executive order rather than statute (Hertzberg, 2009), acceding to the wishes of 
Defense Secretary Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Mullen to allow the military to ease into 
preparations for a change in policy with a comprehensive internal study (Hertzberg, 2009). 
These steps did not satisfy gay rights leaders or religious progressives, but they did energize 
criticism from a coalition of religious conservatives. The introduction of the Respect for 
Marriage Act by liberal members of the House Democrats, continuing state battles over gay 
marriage, and a highly publicized same-sex marriage ordinance in Washington, DC, had 
activated conservative alliances comprising evangelicals, Catholics, Black Protestants, and others 
opposing these measures. Now a national coalition was formalized by the “Manhattan 
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Declaration,” signed by a host of evangelical leaders, Catholic bishops and archbishops, 
Orthodox clergy, and Black Protestant ministers. The tone of the document was strongly critical 
of administration actions on both abortion and gay rights (Goodstein, 2009). Although President 
Obama was still hoping to avoid the political fallout that could be before him, events (mostly 
court decisions) continued to force his hand. A federal district court in July declared DOMA 
unconstitutional, and a month later, another federal district judge ruled that Proposition 8, a 
California referendum passed in 2008 prohibiting same-sex marriage, was an unconstitutional 
denial of equal protection (Schacter, 2010, p 148). And while the Senate was unable to act on a 
House bill repealing DADT, a California federal district judge held the 1993 statute 
unconstitutional, rejecting Justice Department arguments to the contrary (Borch, 2010, p 222) . 
Although a Court of Appeals action stayed this ruling pending appeal, the combination of these 
and later court decisions put gay rights issues high on the political radar and presented the 
administration with a dilemma going into the 2010 elections: take a strong stand on both issues 
and risk losing some centrist religious voters, or delay action and further discourage gay rights 
supporters and liberal groups in a year when Democratic enthusiasm was already lagging.  
Although the repeal of DADT had broader public support and faced less resistance from 
conservative religious groups and Republicans, the prospects for repeal were still clouded. The 
Defense Department’s elaborate review, released on November 30, after the congressional 
elections, recommended the repeal, as expected, but also noted strong objections to inclusion of 
openly gay military personnel by a large section of the chaplaincy and soldiers in combat zones 
(Guth, 2011). Senate Republicans, led by John McCain, continued resistance during the lame 
duck session of Congress, but on December 18, the Senate passed the repeal, which the president 
signed on December 22 before a large and emotional crowd of invited gay rights advocates 
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(Branigan, Wilgoren, and Bacon, 2010). Although some complicated administrative issues 
remained to be settled (like the chaplains), this action left DOMA front and center on the cultural 
battle lines carrying over into Obama’s second two years as president.  
Vice President Biden argued that recognition of same-sex marriage was “inevitable,” even as 
Obama admitted publicly that he was “struggling” with the issue (Kellman, 2010). Despite his 
support for the repeal of DOMA, President Obama still had not come out in support of same-sex 
marriage personally. This would be the backdrop through which the next two years would play 
out; until finally, he was forced to choose a side.  
 
President Obama Midterms – Present:  
 On February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter to Speaker of the House 
John Boehner. In the letter he stated that the views of the executive branch had changed in 
reference to DOMA. He began his letter by saying: 
After careful consideration, including review of a recommendation from me, the President of the 
United States has made the determination that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(“DOMA”), 1 U.S.C. § 7, as applied to same-sex couples who are legally married under state 
law, violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.   Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
530D, I am writing to advise you of the Executive Branch’s determination and to inform you of 
the steps the Department will take in two pending DOMA cases to implement that 
determination.  
… These new lawsuits, by contrast, will require the Department to take an affirmative position 
on the level of scrutiny that should be applied to DOMA Section 3 in a circuit without binding 
precedent on the issue.  As described more fully below, the President and I have concluded that 
classifications based on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny and that, as applied to 
same-sex couples legally married under state law, Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional (US 
Dept of Justice 2011).  
With this statement, the President and the Executive Branch took a clear position on DOMA. It 
was unconstitutional and would not be defended by them. This was a stark change from the 
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fifteen years prior when DOMA was always defended by the executive and the Justice 
Department, and this change would bring even greater focus onto the debate about DOMA and 
same-sex marriage.   
 The President as of February 2011 had taken a strong stand against DOMA, had 
questioned its constitutionality, told the Justice Department not to defend it, yet he himself had 
not come out in support of Same-sex marriages (Mohler, 2012). On Sunday May 6, 2012, Vice 
President Biden went on Meet the Press. While there, he was asked about same-sex marriage. In 
response he stated, “I am absolutely comfortable with the fact that men marrying men, women 
marrying women and heterosexual men and women marrying one another are entitled to the 
same exact rights, all the civil rights, all the civil liberties,” (Prakash, 2012).  By the next day, 
everyone was speculating that this would force the president to finally state a final answer on his 
“evolving views” on same-sex marriage. On the morning of May 7, 2012, Secretary of Education 
Ed Duncan was on a morning show when he was asked about the Vice-Presidents comments and 
if he supports same-sex marriages. To which he commented, “No one has asked me before, but 
yes I do,” (Prakash 2012). The White House went dark for two days. The Administration did not 
want any other high level officials commenting until the President had a chance to himself. 
Finally on May 9, 2012, the President made his statement on the subject. He said: 
I have to tell you that over the course of several years as I have talked to friends and family and 
neighbors when I think about members of my own staff who are in incredibly committed 
monogamous relationships, same-sex relationships, who are raising kids together, when I think 
about those soldiers or airmen or marines or sailors who are out there fighting on my behalf and 
yet feel constrained, even now that Don’t Ask Don’t Tell is gone, because they are not able to 
commit themselves in a marriage, at a certain point I’ve just concluded that for me personally it 
is important for me to go ahead and affirm that I think same sex couples should be able to get 
married (emphasis added) (Prakash 2012). 
 
20 
 
With those words, the first sitting US president came out in support of same-sex marriage. This 
may not have legally changed anything, but to the LGBT community it was a sign that the times 
had changed. It was no longer the AIDS scare of the 80s or the marriage scare that led to 
DOMA. A new day was here and the President just supported their cause.  
 
Hypothesis: 
 President Obama had just gone against the Black Church and what it had told its 
members. Now two different messages were being sent to the Black community by two possible 
sources of Black political knowledge and opinion. One was saying same-sex marriage was 
immoral, and the other was saying that it was a civil right. What impact would this have of the 
Black community? Would African Americans continue to follow the teachings of the Black 
Church and oppose same-sex marriage as they had with Prop 8, or would they begin to see a new 
prospective, highlighted by President Obama’s view that same-sex marriage is a civil rights 
issue? Who will lead the African American community on this issue? 
 As previously stated, the same-sex marriage debate gives us a unique opportunity to 
study leadership in the African American community for several reasons. First, African 
Americans have remained relatively consistent for a long period of time on the issue of same-sex 
marriage. Second, their views have been shaped by the Church, the pseudo-political leader of the 
African American community. Third, an African American now sits in the most powerful 
political office in the US and is considered an inspiration to the African American community. 
Fourth, the nation as a whole has shifted in favor of same-sex marriage while African Americans 
have stayed in opposition. Next in 2010, President Obama and the Black Church still had similar 
views on the topic of same-sex marriage, but by 2012, these views had become polar opposites. 
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Finally, polling data exists on African Americans and their views on same-sex marriage in both 
time periods. It would be easy to compare to see if a change happens over the time period as 
President Obama changes his opinion. To test this, I posit the following hypothesis and null 
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis: If African Americans are willing to accept political views from sources other than 
the Black Church, than President Obama’s declaration of support for same-sex marriage should 
cause a shift among African Americans towards favoring same-sex marriage. 
 
Null Hypothesis: If the Black Church and its views are the most powerful political factors 
effecting the views of African Americans, than President Obama coming out in support of same-
sex marriage should have no effect. 
 
 I will be using polling data from 2010 (before his support for same-sex marriage) and 
data from 2012 (after his support for same-sex marriage) to see if any significant changes 
occurred in the African American community on the issue of same-sex marriage. Along with 
views on same-sex marriage, I will also look at Obama’s approval rating among African 
Americans to assess if there is a correlation between the level of approval he gets from African 
Americans and the way they perceive same-sex marriage by the 2012 poll. If his views do affect 
them, than African Americans that highly approve of his job performance should show a 
significant decrease in opposition to same sex marriage. In contrast, African Americans who do 
not view his performance positively should have no impact of their views of same-sex marriage. 
I will also look at other factors (such as age, education level, socioeconomic status, etc.) to see if 
any of these have also had an impact on African American views on same-sex marriage. These 
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items must be considered as alternative hypotheses, but could also simply be factors that when 
added to support for Obama give a more accurate image of what is happening in the African 
American community.   
 
The Data:  
  Knowledge Networks is an online survey research group that conducts numerous surveys 
per month for academia, businesses, government organizations, media, etc. Currently Knowledge 
Networks uses only online surveys although they began as a telephone based organization. As 
random-digit-dialing became an issue due to increased cellphone use, they moved from phone 
surveys to internet surveys. The Knowledge Panel (groups of individuals used to conduct all of 
Knowledge Networks surveys) is now continuously maintained by using the United States Postal 
Service's Delivery Sequence File. This file is essentially a complete list of all U.S. residential 
households - including households that are cell phone-only and often missed in RDD sampling, 
households without internet services, and low-income households (often Latino and African 
American homes). Knowledge Networks makes original contact through the mail to bypass the 
issues of cell phones or internet. If a household signs up to participate, they must then use 
internet to complete the surveys. To allow the surveys to continue to have poorer communities 
represented, if the household does not have internet, Knowledge Networks supplies them with a 
laptop computer, and they receive an Internet service connection provided and paid for by 
Knowledge Networks.  In doing these things Knowledge Networks is attempting to give a true 
sample population that is representative of the total US population. In addition panel members 
can only participate in a maximum of four surveys per month (no minimum was given) to 
eliminate hyper-internet users.  
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 The Knowledge Network surveys I will be using had 3406 respondents in 2010 and 3606 
respondents in 2012. Some of the statistical demographic breakdowns follow below in Chart 1. 
As one can see, the demographics for age, gender, and race are varied. There is an over-sampling 
in this survey for Latinos and African Americans, but for the purpose of my research, that over-
sampling is needed. In addition to the above demographics, there is also a wide range of diversity   
in household income, educational backgrounds, religious identifications, ideologies, etc. The 
samples created by Knowledge Networks are statistically accurate in representing the US as a 
whole.  
Chart 1: Sample demographics  
Group Year: 2010 Year: 2012 
Male 1699  - 49.88% 1774  -  49.2% 
Female 1707  - 50.12% 1832   - 50.8% 
White 1649 1653 
Latino 932 1110 
African 
American 825 843 
Age: 18-29 594 568 
Age: 30-44 895 908 
Age: 45-59 1028 1097 
Age: 60+ 889 1033 
 
Validity: 
 Shadish, Cook, and Campbell define validity as “the approximate truth to an inference” 
(2002). In other words, validity is how sure we can be that the evidence we obtain from an 
experiment supports our hypothesis as being correct. Shadish, Cook, and Campbell also point out 
that validity is not equal to absolute truth (2002). Validity is an approximation. It is a tentative 
conclusion based on scientific research, but it is not certain. Numerous variables can threaten the 
validity of an experiment. Errors in sample sizes, randomization, time, history, data collection 
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methods, and data analysis are just a few issues that may occur that will reduce the validity of an 
experiment. Shadish, Cook, and Campbell explained four types of validity: Statistical Conclusion 
Validity, Construct Validity, Internal Validity, and External Validity (2002). In the next section, 
each type will be explained and possible treats to the validity will be stated. 
 Internal Validity refers to whether the observed differences between the control group 
(A) and the test group (B) have a causal relationship between A and B in “the form in which the 
variables were manipulated or measured” (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). In simple terms, 
was the treatment the cause of the difference between A and B. A test has a high level of internal 
validity if A precedes B, A covaries with B, and no other plausible explanation exists (Shadish, 
Cook, and Campbell, 2002). Things that may threaten internal validity are selection biases, other 
events occurring simultaneously with treatment, maturation, and attrition, among others.  
 External Validity deals with whether the inferences made in the experiment about the 
causal relationship hold when things like the people and settings change. So for example, if a 
survey is conducted with 3000 people and a second survey is conducted with 3000 different 
people, if the inferences from data that can be made are the same, than they have a high level of 
external validity. Threats to this type of validity are easier to explain with an example. Using the 
survey idea above, say the first group was 3000 white males and the second group was 3000 
African American females, would the results be the same? The likely answer is no. This is one 
type of error in external validity. Others could be if the treatment is modified between 
surveys/studies or if the second group knows the results of the first experiment group. All of 
these would cause variant results between the studies.  
 Statistical Conclusion Validity looks at “two related statistical inferences that affect the 
covariation component of causal inferences: (1) whether the presumed cause and effect covary 
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and (2) how strongly they covary” (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). Essentially, in this 
cause one is trying to prove that the statistical inferences are valid. Most often a null hypothesis 
is used to prove the validity of the experiment. In null hypothesis argues that no relationship 
exists between the presumed cause and effect. The null hypothesis is then tested. An effect exists 
from the cause only if the relationship has a p < .05 (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). 
Possible threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity include unreliability of measurements, 
restriction of ranges, and low statistical power, among others.  
 Construct Validity deals with the issues that arise when attempting to measure an 
abstract. How can one measure levels of freedom, memory, beliefs, etc.? The primary issue with 
construct validity is a lack of clearly defined units so comparison become difficult. Many issues 
can arise when attempting to measure constructs. These include inadequate explanations of the 
construct, self-reporting changes, and novelty, among others (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 
2002). 
Research Design and Measures: 
 For the purpose of testing this hypothesis, I will be using a nonexperimental design. 
Shadish, Cook, and Campbell define a nonexperimental design as on in which “a presumed cause 
and effect are identified and measured but in which other structural feature of an experiment are 
missing” (2002). Among the elements missing that would be in an experimental design are 
pretests, control groups, and random assignment. According to Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, in 
a nonexperimental design, “reliance is placed on measuring alternative explanations individually 
and then statistically controlling for them” (2002). The primary issue with nonexperimental 
designs is that unlike an experiment where cause can be proven when it creates an effect, in 
nonexperimental the link between cause and effect is much weaker. In fact, Shadish, Cook, and 
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Campbell point out that many commentators do not believe that such designs can actually 
support strong causal relationships (2002). 
 Taking all of this into consideration, one may wonder why anyone would ever do a 
nonexperimental design instead of an experimental design. The answer is rather simple. Some 
theories are impossible to study in a controlled experiment. For example, most public opinion 
polls are nonexperimental designs. Someone wants to know information about a policy. They ask 
the question in the poll. Then test the results of the poll and make inferences based on the poll’s 
findings. Most political science research is done this way. If a researcher attempted to do an 
experiment to discover if people liked a policy. He would have to section off two random 
populations. One would be a control group who would not get the new policy. The other would 
get the new policy. Then he would have to measure the results of the study overtime. Imagine 
trying to do that with something as complicated as the Affordable Health Care Act. It would be 
impossible to do. This is why nonexperimental designs are needed.   
 As previously explained this research project is a nonexperimental design because no test 
group or control group exists. I will be using survey data to measure my hypothesis. 
Hypothesis: If African Americans are willing to accept political views from sources other than 
the Black Church, than President Obama’s declaration of support for same-sex marriage should 
cause a shift among African Americans towards favoring same-sex marriage. 
Assuming I am correct, there should be a statistically significant change in African American’s 
opinion on same-sex marriage between 2010 - 2012. I will use other ethnic groups as a control to 
see if they changed similarly or at different rates compared to African Americans.  
 The second step will be to conduct a null-hypothesis. This step will help validate the 
hypothesis through statistical conclusion validity.  
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Null Hypothesis: If the Black Church and its views are the most powerful political factors 
effecting the views of African Americans, than President Obama coming out in support of same-
sex marriage should have no effect. 
If the null hypothesis is correct the results should have a statistical significance over .05. If the 
null hypothesis is wrong the results will have a statistical significance under .05.  
 As for validity, since this is a nonexperimental design, internal validity will be low. 
Without random assortments, control groups, and test groups, there is no experiment to 
duplicate. These absences reduce internal validity drastically. In contrasts, external validity 
increases. Because most polls use a large random sample of people, the likelihood that similar 
results could be achieved by duplicating the poll with different people is good. As long as a 
similar population was used.  Because Knowledge Networks did a survey of well over 3000 
people and controlled for a representative segment of the nation as a whole (income levels, 
religions, genders, races, etc.), it should be possible to initiate a new poll with the same questions 
to get similar results. This would indicate that my research should have similar validity standards 
to other political science polling research that follows the pattern of low internal validity and 
high external validity.  
 I will take the following steps to strengthen the validity of my hypothesis. First, I will 
show that a change in opinion on same-sex marriage did happen between 2010 and 2012. Tables 
1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d will show the change that happened in support for same-sex over the two year 
period by ethnic groups. Once the change has been shown to exist, I move on to looking at 
attitudes towards President Obama. In Tables 2a and 2b, I will break down his approval and 
disapproval ratings by ethnicity with the assumption that African Americans will have the 
highest level of support for President Obama. Next I will build on the two previous section by 
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looking at same-sex marriage and approval ratings in Tables 3a and 3b as well as figures 1a, 1b, 
2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b. I will show that a relationship exists between support for same-sex marriage 
and approval of President Obama. Fourth, to truly test the above relationship, I will run multi-
variable regressions to predict support for same-sex marriage. I will do this by first showing a 
standard demographics model and then using nested models to slowly build a full model. The 
full model will include the standard demographics plus attitudinal variables, religiosity, and 
approval of President Obama. Each of these regressions will be shown side by side for easy 
comparison in Table 4. Once the full model is established, I will compare the full multivariate 
models by ethnic groups to see what factors are the most significant for each group. Table 5a will 
show these additional models for 2010, and Table 5b will show them for 2012. Finally in Table 
6, I will take a closer look at cross-pressured African Americans. I believe this to be the heart of 
the study and could be the group in which the largest change actually happens.   
 
Measures: 
The dependent variable of my research will be support for same-sex marriage. In the surveys, the 
question was asked as follows, “The following is a list of issues we often hear about in the news. 
In general do you favor or oppose the following: Allow homosexual couples to legally marry.” 
Respondents were given 6 possible answers: “refuse to answer,” “Strongly Favor,” “Favor,” 
“Neither oppose nor favor,” “Oppose,” and “Strongly Oppose.” For all charts and models, those 
who refused to answer were eliminated from the calculations. The responses were scaled from 1-
5 with one (1) being most favorable and five (5) being most opposed. Considering the slow 
nature of change over time, I believe that if President Obama had an impact on the African 
American community, the largest change will not be in favor of same-sex marriage but will more 
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likely be a change to “neither support nor oppose.”   I believe this group will have a considerably 
higher rate of change than Latinos and Whites. This will put support moving in the right 
direction per my hypothesis without their having to be a huge pendulum swing in a two year 
period.   
The primary independent variables will be Biblical Literalism, Political Ideology, Political Part 
Identification and Presidential Approval Ratings. In addition, I will also look at the following 
demographic variables: educational levels, economic status, age cohorts, gender, and marital 
status.  
 The Biblical Literalism question asks if one sees the Bible as “The Word of God,” “The 
inspired word of God, but not Literal,” or “Written by man.” I would believe that the likely shift 
will occur in those that believe the Bible is the “Inspired word of God.” Most likely, those who 
see the Bible as written by man will likely not oppose same-sex marriage, and those who see it as 
“The Word of God” will not be moved from opposing same-sex marriage. The battle for support 
rest in the middle group. This is the group that President Obama could have the greatest sway 
with on social issues including same-sex marriage. In regression analysis, I will create a dummy 
variable to test this called “Religiosity.” Since it is nominal variable, I will test “The Word of 
God” with the other two collapsed into a dummy variable.   
 As for the political ideology question, in both surveys it is scored on a 7-point scale. The 
scale ranges from 1 “Strong Liberal” to 7”Strong Conservative” with 4 being “moderate.” In the 
same way, Party Identification is also on the same 7-point scale from most liberal 1 “Strong 
Democrat” to most conservative 7 “Strong Republican” with 4 being “Independent.”   
 The final primary variable will be President Obama’s approval ratings. This is on a 5-
point scale from 1 “strongly support” to 5 “strongly disapprove” with 3 being “Neither support 
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nor oppose.” One of the primary assumptions of this research is that his support among African 
Americans is huge. This overwhelming support is what will allow us to test the impact of his 
change in opinion on the African American population.  
 As for the demographic variables, first I will collapse age down to 5 year increments to 
see if President Obama’s actions are only playing into the ideals of a certain age group. Second, I 
will look at educational background. Traditionally lower education levels increase religiosity, so 
if there is a large change among lower educations levels this could indicate a large effect by 
President Obama. If the change only happens among higher educated persons, this could limit 
the likelihood he had a large impact. Next, I will look at income to see if different income 
brackets look a same-sex marriage in different ways and if one or more had a greater change 
over those two years. The final two thing I will look at are gender and marital status. Traditional 
women see social issues more favorably, so I would assume this will be consistent for same-sex 
marriage. Women should show higher support. As for marital status, I will create a dummy 
variable to see if a person married shows greater or less support for same-sex marriage. I will 
collapse all answers other than “currently married” into an “all other” category and test the two 
against each other.   
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Findings: 
 Table 1a shows the dependent variable “support for same-sex marriage” interacting with 
the independent variable of “race.” The chart shows the breakdown of support and opposition for 
same-sex marriage on a five point scale for each racial group.  
Table 1a: 2010 Support/Opposition for same-sex marriage by ethnic group 
Level of Sup/Opps Whte % Black % Latino % Total % 
Strongly Support 17.65 7.96 12.12 13.82 
Support 15.5 15.42 16.35 15.71 
Neither Sup/Oppose 20.85 21.22 33.59 26.79 
Oppose 15.99 18.53 15.13 16.37 
Strongly Oppose 30.01 26.87 22.81 27.31 
N = 1626 804 899 3329 
 
 The demographics in Table 1a are interesting. First, White have both the highest 
percentages of “strongly support” and “strongly oppose” to same-sex marriage. Whites also have 
the lowest number of “neither support nor oppose.” This should indicate a group that is less 
likely to change from one survey to the next. In contrasts, approximately one-third of Latinos say 
they “neither support nor oppose same-sex marriage.” This could indicate the ability to still 
influence this group on the policy of same-sex marriage. Finally, African Americans are like 
Whites in both high percentages expressing opposition and low levels saying “neither support 
nor oppose.”  This should also indicate a limited change for African Americans.  
 Table 1b illustrates the same set up for 2012 as in 2010. Simply looking at the 
percentages from both surveys and comparing, one can see a clear shift to decreasing opposition 
and increasing support for same-sex marriage over the two year period. To demonstrate, from 
2010 to 2012 the total of all individuals strongly opposing same-sex marriage decreased from 
27.31% to 26.19% accounting for a decrease of 1.12% (Table 1b). This would show a modest 
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decrease which would keep in line with the assumption that since most people had already set 
their minds, there should not be a large change in “strong opposition.”  
Table 1b: 2012 Support/Opposition for same-sex marriage by ethnicity  
Level of Sup/Opps Whte % Black % Latino % Total % 
Strongly Support 19.14 11.42 14.57 15.96 
Support 17.35 15.72 15.6 16.44 
Neither Sup/Oppose 22.4 36.99 34.08 29.35 
Oppose 12.06 10.81 13 12.06 
Strongly Oppose 29.05 25.06 22.75 26.19 
N = 1625 814 1077 3516 
 
 
This is good information, but with five categories, it is also a lot of numbers to compare with 
only small changes.  To attempt to get a clearer picture of what is happening, I collapsed 
“strongly support” and “support” into one category called “support”. I did the same for “strongly 
oppose” and “oppose” by creating a category “oppose.” This is illustrated in Table 1c. In 
addition, I added a column that shows the change in percent per category from 2010-2012. With 
the categories collapsed and with the percent change clearly stated, it become very obvious that 
something affected African American opposition to same-sex marriage between these two 
surveys.  When compared to the other ethnic/racial groups, African American opposition 
dropped by almost twice as much as Whites (-9.53 vs -4.89) and by over four times as much as 
Latinos (-9.53 vs -2.18).  
Table 1c: 2012 Support/Opposition for same-sex marriage by ethnicity with comparision to 2010 
Level of 
Sup/Opp 
White 
2010 
White 
2012 
% 
change 
Black 
2010 
Black 
2012 
% 
change 
Latino 
2010 
Latino 
2012 
% 
change 
Support 33.15 36.49 3.34% 23.38 27.14 3.89 28.47 30.17 1.7 
Neither 
Sup/Oppose 20.85 22.4 1.55% 31.22 36.99 5.76 33.59 34.08 0.49 
Oppose 46 41.11 -4.89% 45.4 35.87 -9.53 37.93 35.75 -2.18 
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Based on these percentages, it seems obvious that something caused a change in the African 
American community between 2010 - 2012 on the issue of same-sex marriage.  
 Having accepted that a significant change did take place in the African American 
community between 2010 and 2012, I next looked at respondents who stated they approved or 
strongly approved of the way President Obama was handling his job. My hypothesis hinges upon 
this group of people being the most likely to be swayed by his change in opinion on same-sex 
marriage. Table 2a below shows President Obama’s approval ratings in 2010, and Table 2b 
shows his approval ratings in 2012. As both numbers and as a percent of sample, President 
Obama increased his approval among all three ethnicities from 2010 to 2012. For Whites, he 
went from 26% saying they either approved or strongly approved to 33%, an increase of 7%. 
Among Blacks, Obama went from a strong 78% approval to 86%, an increase of 8%. Finally 
among Hispanics, Obama went from 36% in 2010 to 57% in 2012, a 21% increase in approval.  
Table 2a: Approval rating by ethnicity 2010 
Approval Level White Black Hispanic 
Strongly Disapprove 29.89 1.98 12.69 
Disapprove 23.9 3.21 14.33 
Neither 20.05 17.06 37.42 
Approve 20.6 42.27 26.26 
Strongly Approve 5.56 35.48 9.3 
n =  1636 809 914 
 
Table 2b: Approval rating by ethnicity 2012 
Approval Level White Black Hispanic 
Strongly Disapprove 30.39 3.78 11.46 
Disapprove 20.56 1.1 9.52 
Neither 15.65 9.39 22.37 
Approve 24.86 39.63 39.19 
Strongly Approve 9.53 46.1 17.47 
n =  1629 820 1082 
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Strong approval ratings have at times been linked to Presidents being able to push agenda items 
through to the American people (Edwards, 2003). President Obama’s ratings do not appear to be 
strong enough among the general populous, but among African Americans, his approval rating is 
rock solid. This high of an approval rating should translate into members of the African 
American community supporting positions on which he stands. With his recent change in 
opinion on same-sex marriage, these type of strong, unwavering, and in fact increasing approval 
ratings should illustrate a group that will follow the President’s lead on any number of topics 
including same-sex marriage. Assuming this assumption is correct, views on same-sex marriage 
should have shifted positively between 2010 and 2012. To determine if this did happen, I looked 
at views on same-sex marriage in both years for individuals who identified as approving or 
strongly approving of President Obama’s job performance.  
Table 3a: Same-sex marriage by ethnicity for those who approve / strongly approve of Obama’10 
Support/Opposition White Black Hispanic 
Strongly Favor 41.59 8.45 21.81 
Favor 28.74 17.22 22.74 
Neither 15.19 28.55 28.66 
Oppose 6.07 20.26 11.84 
Strongly Oppose 8.41 25.52 14.95 
n =  428 627 321 
 
In Table 3a, a few things instantly standout. Among Whites, 70% either favor or strongly favor 
same-sex marriage if they approve of President Obama. For Hispanics, the largest percentage is 
also among those who favor with a combined 44%. Blacks however are in majority opposition to 
same-sex marriage at 46%. What is significant about this opposition is that the opposition come 
from the group that most strongly favors President Obama. In addition to the 46% who oppose 
same-sex marriage almost another 30% say they neither favor nor oppose it, leaving only 25% of 
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the Black community in favor of same-sex marriage. These numbers do seem consistent with 
Egan and Sherrill’s previous finding on Blacks opposition to same-sex marriage. These numbers 
are also prior to President Obama’s change in support towards same-sex marriage, so I would not 
expect anything different from those previous polls.  
Table 3b shows the same question and break down as Table 3a, except for this time it is 2012. In 
the course of those two years, President Obama became the first sitting US President to come out 
in support of same-sex marriage, and the highest ranking African American in history to support 
same-sex marriage. As both a President and a role model among African Americans, his change 
to supporting same-sex marriage should have a noticeable impact on the views of African 
Americans. Table 3b shows that impact does exist.  
Table 3b: Views on same-sex marriage by ethnicity for those who Approve/Strongly Approve of 
Obama 2012 
Support/Opposition White Black Hispanic 
Strongly Favor 41.39 12.02 20.55 
Favor 27.66 16.45 19.41 
Neither 19.23 35.77 32.46 
Oppose 5.31 11.44 11.42 
Strongly Oppose 6.41 24.32 16.15 
n =  546 699 613 
 
 Among Whites who approve of President Obama, a 3% change happened between 
opposition (-3%) and neither support/oppose (+3%). Among Hispanics a 3% changed occurred 
between support (-3%) and neither support/oppose (+3%).  These two groups seemed to have 
had very little change, although they did change. Blacks in contrast had a 10% swing. Opposition 
that was 46% in 2010 was down to 36% in 2012. It also now has a numerical tie with 250 Black 
respondents saying they oppose or strongly oppose same-sex marriage and 250 saying they 
neither oppose nor support. These new numbers of neutrality on the subject show an 8% increase 
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over the two year period. In addition, overall support for same-sex marriage also rose by 2%. 
With Whites and Hispanics having only a 3% change while Blacks have a 10% change, it could 
indicate that President Obama’s change in support on same-sex marriage did have an impact on 
African Americans, specifically those that see him favorable.  
 To continue on with determining support for same-sex marriage, it is necessary to look at 
what happened to all ethnicities from 2010-2012 regardless of their view on President Obama. 
The reasoning behind this is that if everyone has a similar change in view over this time period, 
even those who oppose President Obama, than it is likely he had little or no impact on this issue.  
Figure 1a: White Respondents 2010                                 Figure 1b: White Respondents 2012 
 
In figures 1a and 1b above, graphical representations are shown of the mean answers to whether 
we should “allow homosexual couples to legally marry.” These figures represent White 
respondents in the two surveys. Figure 1a shows White respondents from 2010. As expected, as 
support for President Obama goes up, opposition to same-sex marriage goes down. The chart 
shows a 2.5 mean swing between the mean of a person who strongly disapproves of Obama and 
one who strongly approves of him. Figure 1b shows almost the exact same line with means 
relatively the same for each approval rating as they were in 2010. This indicates that White 
respondents did not change their views on same-sex marriage over the two year time period.  
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Figure 2a: Hispanic Respondents 2010                            Figure 2b: Hispanic Respondents 2012 
 
 
 Figures 2a and 2b above show the mean views on same-sex marriage of Hispanic 
respondents for the two years. The mean line shows a similar pattern to that of Whites; however 
the line is not as steep. Hispanics, like Whites, start near or at 4 on all charts for those who 
strongly disapprove of President Obama. Unlike Whites, they only swing about 1.5 points down 
on the mean scale. Again like how Figure 1a and 1b showed little change, Figure 2a and 2b do 
the same. Hispanics appear to have remained relatively constant on the issue of same-sex 
marriage over the two year period.  
Figure 3a: Black Respondents 2010                                 Figure 3b: Black Respondents 2012 
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Finally Figures 3a and 3b show the views on Black respondents for the two surveys. In Figure 
3a, we see that approval or disapproval of President Obama had essentially no impact on views 
of same-sex marriage. The mean line does have a slight downward slope, but the change from 
strongly disapprove to strongly approve is only 0.2 points in support of same-sex marriage. This 
indicates that Blacks were consistent in their views on same-sex marriage regardless of their 
views on President Obama. However, this is prior to President Obama coming out in support of 
same-sex marriage.  
 Figure 3b, unlike the 2012 figures for Whites and Hispanics, does show a change in 
Black views on same-sex marriage between 2010 and 2012, however minor. Those who view 
President Obama with strong disapproval went up to a mean of 3.7. While those who strongly 
approve went down to 3.2 mean. This is a 0.5 change between strong disapproval and strong 
approval which is up from 0.2 in 2010. This is a change in a group that has been noticeably 
unwavering in their opposition to same-sex marriage over the last twenty years. Although slight, 
this change in downward slope is the best indicator so far that President Obama has had an 
impact on the Black community as it pertains to same-sex marriage. To test this further I will run 
a multivariate model to determine if President Obama is truly the cause of this effect.  
Table 4 shows the multivariate model. The six models that make up each table are 1) standard 
demographics (age, income, education, gender, ethnicity, and marital status), 2) standard 
demographics plus political party identification, 3) standard demographics plus political 
ideology, 4) standard demographics plus religiosity (dummy variable – “word of God” and “all 
other answers”), 5) standard demographics plus approval ratings of President Obama, and 6)  
standard demographics plus political party identification, political ideology, religiosity, and 
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approval ratings. Each of these regressions will be shown side by side for easy comparison in 
Table 4.   
Table 4: Regression models for all respondents predicting opposition to same-sex marriage 2010 
with standardized Betas 
Variable 
Model 1: 
Demograph 
Model 2: 
Party ID 
Model 3: 
Ideology 
Model 4: 
Religiousity 
Model 
5:Approval 
Model 6: 
All 
Constant 3.575 2.29 1.983 2.822 4.892 2.388 
  (0.127) -0.126 (0.119) (0.130) (0.124) (0.151) 
Age 0.012 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.008 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income -0.013 -0.028 -0.022 0.0003 -0.02 -0.016 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Education -0.096 -0.095 -0.093 -0.052 -0.078 -0.056 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Female -0.317 -0.252 -0.278 -0.357 -0.231 -0.266 
  (0.047) (0.043) (0.041) (0.045) (0.042) (0.039) 
Black 0.275 0.803 0.567 0.113 0.866 0.726 
  (0.072) (0.069) (0.064) (0.071) (0.069) (0.065) 
Married 0.58 0.448 0.335 0.447 0.451 0.259 
  (0.050) (0.046) (0.044) (0.049) (0.046) (0.043) 
Party ID   0.353       0.068 
    (0.013)       (0.016) 
Ideology     0.449     0.286 
      (0.013)     (0.017) 
Religiosity       0.899   0.604 
        (0.052)   (0.046) 
Approval 
rating         -0.483 -0.218 
          (0.018) (0.020) 
R2 0.093 0.261 0.334 0.17 0.26 0.408 
Adj R2 0.091 0.26 0.333 0.169 0.259 0.406 
(N=3185, p < 0.05 in bold) 
 
Table 4 shows the multivariate regression models for African Americans in 2010. “Black” is 
added in as a dummy variable to see the effect being African American has on the regression 
model. Model 1, which shows only the standard demographics, was only able to explain 9.3% of 
respondents answers. Model 2 adds political party identification to the standard demographics 
and was able to explain 26.1% of respondents’ answers. Model 3 added Political Ideology to the 
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standard demographics and was able to explain 33.4%. Model 4 is standard demographics plus 
religiosity. This model was only able to explain 17% of respondents’ answers, but it did show 
that when considering only religiosity as an additional variable that being African American and 
level of income are non-significant. Model 5 added approval rating for President Obama to the 
standard demographics. This model explained 26%. Between the four models ran with standard 
demographics and only one extra variable each, the average R-squared and Adjusted R-squared 
were only able to explain about 25% or respondents’ answers. However when each of these were 
added together with the standard demographics in Model 6, they were able to explain 40.8% of 
respondents’ answers with all variables being significant.  
Having shown that being African American was significant on views about same-sex marriage in 
every model except Model 4: Religiosity, it is necessary to show what factors are effecting 
African Americans’ views on same-sex marriage most directly. To do this, I will compare the 
multivariate models by ethnic groups. I will remove the dummy variable “black” and run the full 
nested model for each ethnic group individually. The results of these regressions are below in 
Tables 5a (for 2010) and 5b (for 2012).  
 Table 5a shows the multivariate regression models for the different ethnic groups in 
2010. In Table 5, Model 6 is the same Model 6 as in Table 4. It is put here for easy side to side 
comparisons. To explain the models, I will first look at each one individually, and then I will do 
a side by side comparison. Model 7 shows the multivariate regression for Whites. In Model 7, 
every variable tested was significant. In addition, Model 7 explained 48% of White views on 
same-sex marriage. This is significantly higher than the original demographic model and higher 
than Model 6. Since everything is significant in this regression, it is worth noting that religiosity 
and ideology have the greatest impact on White views on same-sex marriage. As ideology 
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becomes more conservative and if one sees the Bible as the “Word of God,” one is much more 
likely to strongly oppose same-sex marriage.  
Table 5a: Regression models predicting opposition to same-sex marriage 2010 by ethnic group 
with standardized Betas 
Variable Model 6: All Model 7: Whites 
Model 8: 
Hispanic Model 9: Blacks 
Constant 2.388 2.408 2.301 2.52 
  (0.151) (0.186) (0.368) (0.505) 
Age 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.01 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Income -0.016 -0.013 -0.015 -0.027 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.016) 
Education -0.056 -0.069 -0.023 -0.021 
  (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) (0.036) 
Female -0.266 -0.267 -0.294 -0.098 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.109) (0.127) 
Black 0.726 n/a n/a n/a 
  (0.065)       
Married 0.259 0.259 0.186 0.324 
  (0.043) (0.044) (0.015) (0.149) 
Party ID 0.068 0.061 0.033 0.035 
  (0.016) (0.019) (0.040) (0.058) 
Ideology 0.286 0.326 0.204 0.163 
  (0.017) (0.020) (0.040) (0.047) 
Religiosity 0.604 0.599 0.548 0.49 
  (0.046) (0.054) (0.117) (0.126) 
Approval rating -0.218 -0.247 -0.146 -0.038 
  (0.020) (0.024) (0.053) (0.070) 
R2 0.408 0.482 0.243 0.147 
Adj R2 0.406 0.48 0.228 0.124 
N = 3185 2351 453 380 
(p < 0.05 in bold) 
 
 Model 8 shows the regression model for Hispanics’ views on same-sex marriage. Unlike 
Whites in Model 7, not every variable is significant in this model. In Model 8, age remains 
significant showing a consistent increase in opposition to same-sex marriage as age increases. 
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Both level of education and income levels are non-significant for the Hispanic community as it 
pertains to same-sex marriage views. Like Model 7, being a female decreases opposition to 
same-sex marriage. In this Model being married is not significant. In addition to education, 
income, and marriage, party identification is not significant in the Hispanic community as it 
relates to same-sex marriage. Again, religiosity and Ideology have the greatest significance in 
increasing opposition to same-sex marriage. In is also worth noting that among Hispanics, higher 
approval of President Obama does relate to lower opposition to same-sex marriage. Model 8 was 
able to explain 24% of Hispanics’ views on same-sex marriage.  
 The last model, Model 9, in Table 5a shows the regression for African Americans. This 
model shows considerable differences from the two models before it. First off, only three 
variables are significant: age, marriage, and religiosity. Each of these positively affects 
opposition to same-sex marriage. The remaining variables are all non-significant. Notably among 
these are ideology and President Obama’s approval ratings. Based on the earlier nested models in 
which these where highly significant, I had expected them to be significant here as well, but as of 
2010, these are not significant for African American views on same-sex marriage. Model 9 was 
only able to explain 14.7% of Black views on same-sex marriage.  
 Finally from Table 5a, Models 7, 8 and 9 when taken as a whole show some very 
interesting information that is not as easily discerned by looking at them individually. First off, 
age is significant in every model and it has a positive relation to opposition to same-sex 
marriage. Income and education do not effect views of African American or Hispanics on this 
issue. In each model, if the respondent is married, it increases his/her opposition to same-sex 
marriage. Political ideology is significant in each model with increases in conservativism 
reflecting an increase in opposition to same-sex marriage.  One thing that is very interesting is 
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that party identification is not significant for either Hispanics or Blacks. I posit that this is due to 
an overwhelming majority of them identifying as Democrats while having assorted views on the 
issue of same-sex marriage. In the same way, I believe this explains the non-significance of 
Obama’s approval ratings in the African America model. Since so many African Americans 
approve of him and these people have such varied views on same-sex marriage, the model cannot 
use approval rating as a significant way to determine support or opposition for same-sex 
marriage.   
 With an understanding of the information in Table 5a about the 2010 data, we can now 
turn to Table 5b to see what changed by 2012. Table 5b is set up the same as 5a. In the first 
column, I ran a nested model for the same variables as Model 6 in Table 5a but with the 2012 
data set instead. This column is Model 10, and it shows almost identical data as Model 6 did for 
2010. In Model 10, all variables are significant except for income. This is the only change in 
significance between Model 6 and Model 10. Model 10 is able to explain 41.75% of 
respondents’ views on same-sex marriage, and like in the 2010 model, Model 10 shows the 
significance of being African American, religiosity, and President Obama’s approval ratings. 
This combination is what I believe will prove my hypothesis by Model 13 (African American 
2012 model).  
 Model 11 shows the data from White respondents in 2012. Model 11 is very similar to 
the 2010 model for Whites. In Model 11, all of the standard demographics are significant except 
income. Again like in previous models, ideology and religiosity have the greatest impact on the 
model. These two variables contribute to a large increase in opposition to same-sex marriage as 
one increases conservativism and religiosity. Model 11 is able to explain 51.5% of White 
respondents’ views on same-sex marriage. This is a very high percentage for a model fit, and 
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from this, it is easy to see how religiosity and President Obama’s approval affect the views of 
Whites on the issue of same-sex marriage.    
Table 5b: Regression models predicting opposition to same-sex marriage 2012 by ethnic group 
with standardized Betas 
Variable 
Model 10: All 
2012 
Model 11: 
Whites 
Model 12: 
Hispanic 
Model 13: 
Blacks 
Constant 2.67 2.568 2.414 2.401 
  (0.167) (0.198) (0.397) (0.586) 
Age 0.009 0.008 -0.015 0.012 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Income -0.007 -0.009 -0.03 -0.011 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.016) 
Education -0.086 -0.087 -0.047 -0.009 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.020) (0.036) 
Female -0.249 -0.286 -0.126 -0.063 
  (0.038) (0.042) (0.105) (0.127) 
Black 0.619 n/a n/a n/a 
  (0.065)       
Married 0.12 0.186 0.017 -0.194 
  (0.041) (0.044) (0.107) (0.145) 
Party ID 0.067 0.049 0.087 0.073 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.043) (0.065) 
Ideology 0.261 0.311 0.209 0.066 
  (0.017) (0.020) (0.041) (0.047) 
Religiosity 0.718 0.797 0.416 0.526 
  (0.046) (0.054) (0.113) (0.132) 
Approval rating -0.224 -0.235 -0.124 -0.075 
  (0.021) (0.024) (0.054) (0.080) 
R2 0.4175 0.515 0.237 0.077 
Adj R2 0.4159 0.513 0.225 0.056 
N =  3368 2455 505 407 
(p < 0.05 in bold) 
 
  Model 12 shows the Hispanic 2012 regression model. More so than any other 
model comparisons, several things changed significance between 2010 and 2012 for Hispanics. 
First Gender became non-significant in 2012 while it was significant in 2010. Education levels, 
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income, and Party identification were all non-significant in 2010, but they each became 
significant in 2012. In fact, compared to 2010 this time only gender and marriage were non-
significant. Ideology, religiosity, and approval ratings have the greatest impact on the model. Of 
note amongst those is that religiosity is only affecting the model 0.416. This is the lowest 
religiosity effect of any model and it is on a model starting with a relatively low 2.414 constant 
as compared to other models. This indicates that although religiosity is still significant for 
Hispanics, it does not have as much influence for them as it does for Whites and African 
Americans. This Model is able to explain 23.7% of Hispanic views on same-sex marriage which 
is about a half percent less than 2010 Model 8. 
The final new 2012 multivariate regression is Model 13 which looks at African American views 
on same-sex marriage. This is the model that I hoped would show conclusively that President 
Obama had an impact on same-sex marriage views for African Americans between 2010 and 
2012. Unfortunately, Model 13 does the reverse. It shows that President Obama’s approval 
ratings are non-significant in determining African American views on same-sex marriage. In 
Model 13, the only two variables that are significant are age and religiosity. All other variables 
including ideology, party identification, and approval ratings are all non-significant, which in 
itself is an interesting finding because one would expect these to all be significant. Model 13 also 
is only able to explain 7.7% of African American views on same-sex marriage. With all the 
standard demographics, attitudinals, and believed variables that would impact African American 
votes included in the model, almost nothing is explained. This indicates that something else is 
affecting African American views on the subject, but I have yet to be able to determine what that 
is.  
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Table 5b is able to show a few additional things when looked at as a whole instead of as 
individual models. First like in Table 5a, age and religiosity are always significant. Regardless of 
year or ethnicity these two variables remain significant in each model. In contrast to these two, 
income and education level remain non-significant in most models. These two demographics 
seem to have only limited impact on views about same-sex marriage. Another factor to look at is 
the non-significance of party identification of the Hispanic and Black models. I believe this is 
due to the fact that although these two groups have a wide range of views on same-sex marriage, 
they mostly state they are Democrats. This creates a Democrat majority in each ethnic group that 
does not have a clear stance on the issue, so the model cannot account for that.  
 With age and religiosity being the only two consistent variables between all models, I 
want to see if any cross-pressure exists between religion and age that could account for the 
change that happened between 2010 and 2012. President Obama’s 2012 campaign went to great 
lengths to register new voters many of whom were young first time voters. This could account 
for new voters who are supporters of President Obama, who could potentially be religious 
conservatives, and who do not oppose same-sex marriage. If these people exist, it could explain 
the change that happened between 2010 and 2012.  To determine if they do, I ran a cross 
tabulation for same-sex marriage by four age categories. In the cross tabulation I limited it to 
African Americans, who consider the Bible to be the “Word of God,” and who either approve or 
strongly approve of President Obama. The results are depicted in Table 6 below.  
 Table 6 shows cross-pressured African Americans views on same-sex marriage by age 
group and year. This groups supports President Obama but also sees the Bible as Word of God. 
For each of the four age groups (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60+), three columns exist. The first 
column shows that groups percentage of support or opposition to same-sex marriage in 2010. 
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The second column shows the data for 2012, and the third column shows the change in 
percentage between the two years. Three patterns hold up across all age groups: total opposition 
decreases, neither support nor oppose increases, and total support increases. Whatever effected 
African Americans did not affect just one age group, it effected them all in the same way.  
Table 6: Cross-pressured African Americans (who support President Obama and who see the 
Bible as Word of God) views on same-sex marriage by age group and year.  
 
 Looking more closely at the breakdowns of Table 6, one can see if one age group 
changed more than others. Total opposition decreased by the following percentages: 18-29 year 
olds decreased opposition by 8.16%, 30-44 year olds decreased opposition by 10.24%, 45-59 
year olds decreased opposition by 14.92%, and 60+ year olds decreased opposition by 12.02. 
What is most significant about this data is that the greatest percentage changes happened in the 
two oldest age groups. The younger one is still indicated the lowest level of opposition and 
greatest support, but the change happened in the older groups. If the assumption that bringing in 
new young voters caused the change in African American views on same-sex marriage was 
correct, then the greatest impact should have occurred amongst the younger groups. The fact that 
middle aged and elderly are the groups changing the fastest likely indicates something else is 
effecting the community. This ties back to Model 13 in Table 5b. Everything that should be 
explaining what is happening is failing, so something else is occurring that has created a 
significant shift in African American views on same-sex marriage.  
 
Year 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012
Age 18-29 18-29 % chg 30-44 30-44 % chg 45-59 45-59 % chg 60+ 60+ % chg
Strongly Favor 10.34 12.28 1.94 0 8.82 8.82 2.33 8.09 5.76 2.6 1.14 -1.46
Favor 13.79 15.79 2 13.56 11.76 -1.8 11.63 8.09 -3.54 10.39 13.64 2.25
Niether 41.38 45.61 4.23 42.37 45.59 3.23 24.81 37.5 12.69 18.18 28.41 10.23
Oppose 3.45 7.02 3.57 15.25 7.35 -7.9 25.58 11.03 -14.55 24.68 18.18 -6.5
Strongly Oppose 31.03 19.3 -11.73 28.81 26.47 -2.34 35.66 35.29 -0.37 44.16 38.64 -5.52
N= 29 57 59 68 129 136 77 88
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Conclusion: 
 Between 2010 and 2012, African American opposition to same-sex marriage decreased 
by almost 10% while Whites and Hispanics only decreased 4.89% and 2.18% respectively. This 
sharp decrease led to the hypothesis that President Obama’s change in support for same-sex 
marriage between those two years had impacted the views of African Americans on the issue. To 
determine if this was true, I first verified the change in opinion on same-sex marriage did happen 
between 2010 and 2012. Tables 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d, I showed that a change happened in support 
for same-sex over the two year period in each ethnic groups. Once the change was shown to 
exist, I moved on to attitudes towards President Obama. In Tables 2a and 2b, I broke down his 
approval and disapproval ratings by ethnicity and showed that African Americans had the 
highest levels of support for him at or above 85% between the two years.  
Next, to test the above relationship, I ran multi-variable regressions to predict support for same-
sex marriage. I did this by first showing a standard demographics model and then using nested 
models to slowly build a full model. The full model included the standard demographics plus 
attitudinal variables, religiosity, and approval of President Obama. Each of these regressions 
where then shown side by side for easy comparison in Table 4. Once that full model was 
established, I compared the full multivariate models by ethnic groups to see what factors were 
the most significant for each group. Table 5a showed these additional models for 2010, and 
Table 5b showed them for 2012. Prior to Table 5b, it appeared that my hypothesis would be 
correct, however in Model 13 that should the African American regressions, only age and 
religiosity were significant. President Obama’s approval ratings had no effect on the model. This 
disproved my hypothesis and proved the null hypothesis.  
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As one final attempt to see if I could determine what was effecting the African American 
community if it is not President Obama, I created Table 6 to look at cross-pressured African 
Americans. This group supports President Obama but also sees the Bible as the “Word of God.” 
When this group was broken down by 4 age categories, it was shown that the greatest decrease in 
opposition happened in the two oldest groups. This was contrary to standard beliefs that younger 
age groups are changing faster. This also did not shed any new insight into what is happening in 
the African American community on the issue of same-sex marriage.  
With a 10% decrease in opposition over two years, something has shifted for African Americans, 
but my research has not shown what that may be. Further research is needed on this subject. I 
would propose that in future surveys an open ended question could be added that would allow 
the respondent to say what has most influenced their view on same-sex marriage. This would 
allow us to see what variables are having the most impact. For example, if the older age groups 
had said that having a child or grandchild that has recently come out affected their views, it may 
have given credence back to President Obama affecting the community. With his acceptance 
perhaps more black men and women found it acceptable to come out of the closet which 
increased the number of individuals who knew someone who was gay. In this way President 
Obama indirectly could have impacted these people’s views. This type of open ended question in 
the future could help push future research on the subject.  
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Future Research: 
 I would propose doing a study on the effects of leadership in the black church on their 
congregations’ political ideologies and in a more general way, the political views of the 
community in which the church serves. My belief is that the members of the congregation would 
have the same political ideologies as the head of that church, so if the pastor is more liberal, the 
congregation would see political issues in a more liberal way. If the pastor is more conservative, 
the congregation would also be more conservative on political issues. This would also translate 
into voting behavior in elections.   
 To test this hypothesis, I would conduct a survey of all African American pastors in a 
major predominantly minority city (New Orleans or Atlanta for example). The key is that 
whichever city was chosen, it would have to have a major social issue question being raised on 
an upcoming ballot. The survey would question the pastors’ views on political issues like same-
sex marriage, abortion, prayer in school, and other issues. Once I had the surveys from the 
pastors, I could review the results to determine which were more liberal on issues and which 
were more conservative. For each pastor’s church, it would also be necessary to determine what 
are the estimated lines of the community it serves, so is it a small neighborhood church that only 
serves the surrounding ten blocks or is it a larger church that covers a two mile radius around.  
 With that information determine, I could then use precinct level data to map out how 
members of different communities voted on the social issue in question. If my hypothesis is 
correct that the leadership of the church is influencing the policy decisions of the congregation, 
then in areas were the pastor is more conservative, the election results should show opposition to 
the social issue. In contrast, where the pastor is more liberal the issue should have less opposition 
and possibly even support. In addition, if no pattern emerges on where people support/oppose the 
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issue in reference to the ideology of the Church in that community, it could indicate that the 
Black Church has lost its influence over African American political views.  
 In this survey, entire African American population of the city is the population of the 
study. I would word the hypothesis to question if a more conservative pastor correlates to more 
conservative political views. The members of the community that go to the conservative 
churches would be the Test Group. The members who go to the liberal churches would be the 
control group. Any member of the community could go to the church of their choice, so it is 
randomized. The results are easily testable because it is reported election returns simply broken 
down by precincts. If the data covers an entire major metro city, and the pattern holds true for 
each of the communities, I believe it would show a very high level of external validity. I would 
surmise that every major African American city would follow similar patterns of voting 
behaviors based on the what people are in what communities with either liberal or conservative 
pastors. 
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Do File for 2010 Data Set: 
 
use "C:\Users\Kevin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\ZWBOVATU\2010 
Blair Rockefeller Data Original.dta"  
sum ppage 
tab ppage 
generate age = recode(ppage,19,24,29,34,39,44,49,54,59,64,69,74,93) 
tab age 
label variable age "Age in 5 Year Increments" 
sum age 
label define ageinc 19 "18-19 yrs" 24 "20-24 yrs" 29 "25-29 yrs" 34 "30-34 yrs" 39 "35-39 yrs" 
44 "40-44 yrs" 49 "45-49 yrs" 54 "50-54 yrs" 59 "55-59 yrs" 64 "60-64 yrs" 69 "65-69 yrs" 74 
"70-74 yrs" 93 "75+ yrs" 
label values age ageinc 
tab age 
sum q36b_3 
tab q36b_3 
tab age q36b_3 
sum age q36b_3 
sum q36b_3 
sum ppage 
tab age q13 
tab ppgender 
sum ppgender 
recode ppgender (1=0) (2=1) 
label define gender_label 1 "Female" 0 "Male" 
label values ppgender gender_label 
tab ppgender 
sum ppgender 
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tab q24 
recode q24 (-1=.) 
tab q24 
tab q23 
recode q23 (-1=.)  
tab q23 
recode q36b_3 (-1=.) 
tab age 
tab q13 
recode q13 (-1=.) 
sum q13 
gen Religiosity = q13 
tab Religiosity 
recode Religiosity (2=0) (3=0) 
tab Religiosity 
label define relg 1 "Bible is the exact Word of God" 0 "Other views" 
label values Religiosity relg 
tab Religiosity 
generate white = ppethm 
recode white (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) 
tab white 
label define eth 1 "White, non- Hispanic" 0 "non-whites"  
label values white eth 
tab white 
generate black = ppethm 
recode black (1=0) (3=0) (4=0) (2=1) 
tab black 
label define eth2 1 "Black, non- Hispanic" 0 "non-Black"  
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label values black eth2 
tab black 
generate hisp = ppethm 
recode hisp (1=0) (2=0) (3=1) (4=0)  
tab hisp 
generate hispanic = ppethm 
recode hispanic (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=1)  
tab hispanic 
label define eth3 1 "Hispanic" 0 "non-Hispanic"  
label values hispanic eth3 
tab hispanic 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic [iweight = weight1] 
tab ppmarit 
sum ppmarit 
generate married = ppmarit 
recode married (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) (6=0) 
label define marry 1 "Currently Married" 0 "All others" 
label values married marry 
tab married 
tab q42 
recode q42 (-1=.) 
tab q42 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married q23 [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married q24 [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married Religiosity [iweight = weight1] 
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reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married q42 [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married q23 q24 Religiosity q42 [iweight = 
weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married q23 [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married q24 [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married Religiosity [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married q42 [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married q23 q24 Religiosity q42 [iweight = 
weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married  [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married q23  [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married q24  [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married Religiosity [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married  q42 [iweight = weight1] 
reg q36b_3 age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married q23 q24 Religiosity q42 [iweight = 
weight1] 
graph bar (mean) q36b_3, over (q42) over (black) asyvars 
graph bar (mean) q36b_3, over (q42) over (white) asyvars 
graph bar (mean) q36b_3, over (q42) over (hispanic) asyvars 
graph bar (mean) q36b_3, over (q42) over (ppethm) asyvars 
graph bar (mean) q36b_3, over (Religiosity) over (ppethm) asyvars 
graph bar (mean) q36b_3, over (q23) over (ppethm) asyvars 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 ppethm) (lfit q36b_3 ppethm) 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 age) (lfit q36b_3 age) 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q23) (lfit q36b_3 q23) 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q24) (lfit q36b_3 q24) 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q42) (lfit q36b_3 q42) 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q42) (lfit q36b_3 q42) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
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twoway (scatter q36b_3 q42) (lfit q36b_3 q42) if ppethm < 2 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q42) (lfit q36b_3 q42) if ppethm > 3 
tab ppethm q42 
tab ppethm q27 
tab ppethm q23 
tab ppethm q23 
tab ppethm q24 
twoway (scatter q23 ppethm) (lfit q23 ppethm) 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q42) (lfit q36b_3 q42) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
tab ppethm q36b_3 if q42 > 3 
tab q42 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q42) (lfit q36b_3 q42) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 age) (lfit q36b_3 age) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 ppincimp) (lfit q36b_3 ppincimp) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 ppeduc) (lfit q36b_3 ppeduc) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 ppgender) (lfit q36b_3 ppgender) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 married) (lfit q36b_3 married) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q23) (lfit q36b_3 q23) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q24) (lfit q36b_3 q24) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
tab q13 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q13) (lfit q36b_3 q13) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter q36b_3 q24) (lfit q36b_3 q24) 
tab black q24 
tab black q24 
tab black q13 
tab black q23 
tab black q42 
tab black age 
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tab black ppgender 
tab black married 
tab black ppincimp 
tab black ppeduc 
tab black q24 if q23 < 4 
tab black q24 if q23 >3 
tab black q24 if q23==4 
tab black q24 if q23 > 4 
tab q23 q24 if black==1 
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Do File for 2012 Data Set: 
 
use 
"C:\Users\Kevin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\KKJHV5KL\National_Main
_Client (1).dta"  
sum ppage 
tab ppage 
generate age = recode(ppage,19,24,29,34,39,44,49,54,59,64,69,74,93) 
tab age 
label variable age "Age in 5 Year Increments" 
sum age 
label define ageinc 19 "18-19 yrs" 24 "20-24 yrs" 29 "25-29 yrs" 34 "30-34 yrs" 39 "35-39 yrs" 
44 "40-44 yrs" 49 "45-49 yrs" 54 "50-54 yrs" 59 "55-59 yrs" 64 "60-64 yrs" 69 "65-69 yrs" 74 
"70-74 yrs" 93 "75+ yrs" 
label values age ageinc 
tab age 
sum Q39_C 
tab Q39_C 
tab age Q39_C 
sum age Q39_C 
sum Q39_C 
sum ppage 
tab age Q17 
tab ppgender 
sum ppgender 
recode ppgender (1=0) (2=1) 
label define gender_label 1 "Female" 0 "Male" 
label values ppgender gender_label 
tab ppgender 
sum ppgender 
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tab Q28 
recode Q28 (-1=.) 
tab Q28 
tab Q27 
recode Q27 (-1=.)  
tab Q27 
recode Q39_C (-1=.) 
tab age 
tab Q17 
recode Q17 (-1=.) 
sum Q17 
gen Religiosity = Q17 
tab Religiosity 
recode Religiosity (2=0) (3=0) 
tab Religiosity 
label define relg 1 "Bible is the exact Word of God" 0 "Other views" 
label values Religiosity relg 
tab Religiosity 
generate white = ppethm 
recode white (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) 
tab white 
label define eth 1 "White, non- Hispanic" 0 "non-whites"  
label values white eth 
tab white 
generate black = ppethm 
recode black (1=0) (3=0) (4=0) (2=1) 
tab black 
label define eth2 1 "Black, non- Hispanic" 0 "non-Black"  
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label values black eth2 
tab black 
generate hisp = ppethm 
recode hisp (1=0) (2=0) (3=1) (4=0)  
tab hisp 
generate hispanic = ppethm 
recode hispanic (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=1)  
tab hispanic 
label define eth3 1 "Hispanic" 0 "non-Hispanic"  
label values hispanic eth3 
tab hispanic 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic [iweight = weight1] 
tab ppmarit 
sum ppmarit 
generate married = ppmarit 
recode married (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) (6=0) 
label define marry 1 "Currently Married" 0 "All others" 
label values married marry 
tab married 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married Q28 Q27 Religiosity [iweight = 
weight1] 
tab Q17 
tab Q32 
tab Q44 
recode Q44 (-1=.) 
tab Q44 
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reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married Q28 Q27 Religiosity [iweight = 
weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married  Religiosity [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married Q44 [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender white married Q28 Q27 Religiosity Q44 [iweight = 
weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married Q27 [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married Q28 [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married Religiosity [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married Q44 [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender hispanic married Q27 Q28 Religiosity Q44 [iweight 
= weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married  [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married Q27  [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married Q28  [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married Religiosity [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married  Q44 [iweight = weight1] 
reg Q39_C age ppincimp ppeduc ppgender black married Q27 Q28 Religiosity Q44 [iweight = 
weight1] 
graph bar (mean) Q39_C, over (Q44) over (ppethm) asyvars 
graph bar (mean) Q39_C, over (Q27) over (ppethm) asyvars 
twoway (line Q39_C Q27, sort) 
twoway (line Q39_C Q28, sort) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C ppethm) (lfit Q39_C ppethm) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C age) (lfit Q39_C age) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q27) (lfit Q39_C Q27) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q28) (lfit Q39_C Q28) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Religiosity ) (lfit Q39_C Religiosity) 
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twoway (scatter Q39_C Q44) (lfit Q39_C Q44) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C married ) (lfit Q39_C married) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C black ) (lfit Q39_C black) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C white ) (lfit Q39_C white) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C hispanic ) (lfit Q39_C hispanic) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C ppethm) (lfit Q39_C ppethm) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C age) (lfit Q39_C age) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q27) (lfit Q39_C Q27) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q28) (lfit Q39_C Q28) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q44) (lfit Q39_C Q44) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q44) (lfit Q39_C Q44) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q44) (lfit Q39_C Q44) if ppethm < 2 
tab ppethm 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q44) (lfit Q39_C Q44) if ppethm > 3 
tab ppethm Q44 
tab ppethm Q39_C if Q44 > 3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C ppethm) (lfit Q39_C ppethm) 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q44) (lfit Q39_C Q44) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q44) (lfit Q39_C Q44) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C age) (lfit Q39_C age) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C ppincimp) (lfit Q39_C ppincimp) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C ppeduc) (lfit Q39_C ppeduc) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C ppgender) (lfit Q39_C ppgender) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C married) (lfit Q39_C married) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q27) (lfit Q39_C Q27) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q28) (lfit Q39_C Q28) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q17) (lfit Q39_C Q17) if ppethm >1 & ppethm <3 
twoway (scatter Q39_C Q28) (lfit Q39_C Q28) 
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tab black Q28 
tab black Q17 
tab black Q27 
tab black Q44 
tab black age 
tab black ppgender 
tab black married 
tab black ppincimp 
tab black ppeduc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
